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Recent Developments
In re: Maurice M.: CIVIL CONTEMPT

ORDER DIRECTING MOTHER
SUSPECTED OF CHILD ABUSE TO
PRODUCE THE JUVENILE HELD
TO VIOIATE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in In
re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391,550 A.2d 1135
(1988), held that a civil contempt order
from the Juvenile Court which directed a
mother suspected of child abuse to produce her son before the court or to reveal
his exact whereabouts violated her fifth
amendment
right to avoid selfincrimination. The mother's act of producing the juvenile before the court is
implicitly a testimonial communication by
which she could incriminate herself in the
circumstances of this case, and so falls
within the protection afforded by the fifth
amendment.
Maurice M. is the son of Jacqueline
Bouknight. In January 1987, at the age of
three months, Maurice was admitted to the
hospital with a broken leg. This injury and
the presence of other, partially healed fractures on his body, together with his
mother's history of emotional problems
and the fact that his father had just been
released from prison for drug violations,
prompted the Baltimore City Department
of Social Services (DSS) to obtain an authorization from the Juvenile Court in
February 1987 to provide shelter care for
Maurice. The child was placed in foster
care until July 17, 1987, at which time the
Shelter Care Order was modified and
Maurice was returned to Bouknight.
At a hearing on August 18, 1987,
Maurice was found to be a child in need of
assistance (CINA) under Md. Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Code Ann. §§ 3-801(e)-3-804. As
such, he was placed under an Order of Protective Supervision to DSS .. Under this
order, Bouknight retained custody of
Maurice, agreed to "cooperate" with DSS,
to utilize the assistance of a parent aide,
and to refrain from physically punishing

the child. Bouknight, however, failed to
cooperate with DSS. Maurice was last seen
on March 23, 1988.
On April 18, 1988, DSS filed a Motion
for Contempt against Bouknight, alleging
that she had refused to provide the whereabouts of Maurice to DSS representatives
who visited her home on April 7. At a
hearing before the Juvenile Master on
April 20, which Bouknight did not attend,
DSS was awarded custody of Maurice due
to Bouknight's failure to comply with the
Order of Protective Supervision. The
court also held a hearing on the contempt
motion and ordered Bouknight to show
cause why she should not be held in contempt for failure to produce the child in
court.
Bouknight was arrested and appeared
before the court on April 27, 1988. She
told the court, although the was not under
oath and no fifth amendment objections
were raised at the time, that Maurice was
in Texas with her sister. A police investigation revealed that Maurice had not been
seen by Bouknight's sister, and on April
28, Bouknight was found in contempt for
not producing Maurice or revealing his
whereabouts. Counsel responded that
Bouknight's opportunity to purge herself
of the contempt was not a constitutional
one if "her purging herself may involve
admitting to a crime of some sort." Id. at
396, 550 A.2d at 1137.
On May 18, 1988, Bouknight moved to
strike the contempt order on fifth amendment grounds. She contended that the
basis of the contempt order was that she
must produce statements or evidence that
might incriminate her. The court rejected
the argument, finding that Bouknight was
not required to give any testimony, but
only to perform an act, i.e., to produce the
child. Failure to produce Maurice was the
reason the contempt order was issued, not
any failure to testify. Bouknight appealed
this ruling, and the Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari prior to a

decision by an intermediate appellate court
to consider this important issue.
The court stated that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
"protects a witness from being required to
make disclosure, otherwise compellable in
the trial court's contempt power, which
could incriminate him in a later criminal
prosecution." Whitaker'lJ. Prince George's
County, 307 Md. 368, 385, 514 A.2d 4
(1986). Although the historic function of
the fifth amendment privilege has been to
protect an individual from selfincrimination through his own testimony,
the court examined several Supreme Court
cases in which fifth amendment protection
was also sought by individuals under court
order to produce documents and other
physical evidence.
In Fisher 'lJ. United States, 425 V.S. 391
(1976), the Court held that a client's fifth
amendment privilege was not violated by
enforcing a summons directing his attorney to produce the client's documents,
since the client was not thereby compelled
to be a witness against himself. But, in
United States 'lJ. Doe, 465 V.S. 605 (1984)
(Doe I), the Court held that the act of
producing the subpoenaed business
records of a sole proprietorship was privileged. Complying with the subpoena, the
Court reasoned, tacitly conceded the existence of the records, their possession or
control by the party under subpoena, and
the authenticity of the records. Id. at 613.
Hence, the act of producing the documents had testimonial aspects and an
incriminating effect.
In Doe 'lJ. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2341
(1988) (Doe 11), the Court affirmed its Doe
I stance that "the act of production could
constitute protected testimonial communication, because it might entail implicit
statements of fact: by producing documents in compliance with a subpoena, the
witness would admit that the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and
were authentic." Id. The Court held that
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the compelled execution of consent forms
authorizing foreign banks to disclose
records of the defendant's accounts did not
infringe upon the fifth amendment privilege, because neither the consent form nor
its execution communicated any factual
assertion. The Court explained that "to be
testimonial, an accused's communication
must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate
an actual assertion or disclose information
[because] [o]nly then is a person compelled
to be a 'witness' against himself." fd.
Similarly, in United States v. Campos·
Serrano, 430 F .2d 173 (7th Cir. 1970), the
court found a violation of the fifth amendment priv~lege when a defendant was
coerced into producing a forged alien registration card. The court ruled that, in prcr
ducing the card, the defendant implicitly
admitted the existence, location and control over the card and so was "compelled
to produce the crime itself." fd. at 176.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized, in the case sub judice, that Bouknight had a reasonable apprehension of
prosecution if, in accordance with the
court's order, she produced Maurice or
revealed his whereabouts, and the information disclosed that the child had suffered
further abuse or was even dead. If a crime
has been committed upon Maurice's person, Bouknight, by disclosing the demanded information, would be incriminating
herself. The court ruled that such communication, whether in the form of the compelled act of production or verbal
disclosure, is implicitly a testimonial communication and so falls within the contemplation of the fifth amendment privilege.
The court also addressed the State's argument that Bouknight waived her fifth
amendment privileges when she told the
court that Maurice was in Texas. The
court noted that Bouknight was not a
witness when she imparted this information, nor was she under oath, and the inaccurate information she revealed was not
directly incriminating. Thus, the court
ruled that Bouknight's fifth amendment
privilege remained intact.
The State's alternative contention that
the public right to protect its children, as
manifested by the Juvenile Causes Act,
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §§
3-801-3-836 (1984), outweighs Bouknight's fifth amendment privilege was
rejected by the court. Although the court
recognized the validity of the State's argument that applying the constraints of the
fifth amendment in cases of child abuse
would afford a parent "carte blanche to
conceal any negative information about
the child's status and thereby strip the
Juvenile Court of its ability to protect
children suspected of being abused," it

held that case law does not favor statutory
requirements over constitutional protection when there is a strong possibility of
incrimination. Maurice M. at 408, 550 A.2d
at 1143. Under the circumstances of this
case, where the risk to Bouknight of prosecution is so substantial, the court could not
totally expunge Bouknight's fifth amendment rights. Thus, the court vacated the
civil contempt order.
In a strong dissent, Judge McAuliffe
stated that by producing Maurice, Bouknight would implicitly admit that 1) the
child is Maurice, and that 2) she has sufficient control and dominion over the child
to produce him. Although these facts
might be used against Bouknight in a
criminal prosecution, Judge McAuliffe
argued that communications which can be
classified as foregone conclusions or as selfevident information are of minimal testimonial significance, and consequently
should not be afforded fifth amendment
protection. Since Maurice could be identified solely by the scope of his injuries, and
since evidence of who had control and
dominion over the child furnishes no evidence of who had control over him at the
time of his injuries, no significant evidence
which merits fifth amendment protection
can be gleaned from the production of
Maurice.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
vacated a civil contempt order of the
Juvenile Court by which a mother
suspected of child abuse was directed to
produce the juvenile before the court or
disclose his whereabouts. Under the circumstances of the case, the court decided
that the mother's act of producing the
child had testimonial implications that
could incriminate her in the event of a
criminal prosecution. Thus, the mother's
claim of privilege under the fifth amendment was upheld.

- Mary fo Murphy
Richmond v. Croson Co.: SUPREME
COURT INVALIDATES SET-ASIDE
PLAN DESIGNED TO PROVIDE
JOBS FOR MINORITIES
The United States Supreme Court struck
down a city ordinance that channeled 30%
of public funds to minority-owned construction companies because it violated the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause. Richmond v. Croson Co. 57
U.S.L.W. 4132 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1989). For
the first time, a majority of the Court has
adopted strict scrutiny as the standard for
equal protection review of race-conscious
legislation.
The Richmond City Council adopted

the Minority Business Utilization Plan
("the Plan"), a minority set-aside program
that required prime contractors of city
construction projects to subcontract at
least 30% of the dollar amount of the contract to Minority Business Enterprises
(MBEs). The Plan was modeled after the
congressional program in Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), which was
held constitutional. The Plan's propon.ents
claimed, inter alia, that although Richmond's general population was 50% black,
only .67% of the city's prime construction
contracts had been awarded to MBEs in a
five-year period. Thus, the plan was
declared "remedial."
A facial challenge to the ordinance was
brought in 1983 by J .A. Croson Co.
("Croson"), a white-owned plumbing
company which lost a $126,000 contract to
provide plumbing fixtures for the city jail.
Croson, the sole bidder on the project,
tried to comply with the set-aside requirement but was unable to obtain any MBEs
to subcontract for the job. Croson sought
waiver of the set-aside requirement, indicating that the MBEs contacted were either
unqualified, unresponsive, or unable to
quote a bid. fd at 4436. Richmond denied
Croson's request and decided to rebid the
project. fd.
Because the Plan was patterned after the
program in Fullilove, both the federal district court and the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit relied on the Fullilove
precedent and upheld the Plan. Croson
sought certiorari; the Supreme Court
vacated the court of appeal's decision and
remanded the case in light of Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267
(1986). On remand, the court of appeals
struck down the Plan because it violated
both prongs of strict scrutiny under the
equal protection clause.
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that strict scrutiny was
the proper standard of review, and that the
Plan failed both prongs of that test: (1) that
the state had a compelling interest; and (2)
that its Plan was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. As to the first prong of
the test, the Court held that the city failed
to "demonstrate a compelling interest in
apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race" because it
adduced no evidence of "any identified discrimination in the Richmond construction
industry." Croson at 4142. Although Richmond argued that it was attempting to
remedy various forms of past discrimination, it did not offer specific acts of discrimination, but rather it relied on general
assertions of past discrimination coupled
with the similar inference drawn from
various statistical disparities. Richmond
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